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PANEL VI: THE COEXISTENCE OF PRIVACY
AND SECURITY
FOURTH AMENDMENT CODIFICATION AND
PROFESSOR KERR’S MISGUIDED CALL FOR
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
Daniel J. Solove*
INTRODUCTION
Criminal procedure courses covering search and seizure rules are almost
always taught by focusing on the Fourth Amendment. Yet it is becoming
ever more the case that the Fourth Amendment is playing a smaller role in
regulating law enforcement investigations involving information privacy.
Fourth Amendment protection continues to recede from a litany of law
enforcement activities, and it is being replaced by federal statutes. We are
witnessing a codification of the Fourth Amendment.
This essay examines the development of Fourth Amendment
codification. Few have examined this trend. Since the criminal procedure
revolution of the Warren Court era, the courts have been the primary
rulemakers in the field of criminal procedure. Within the past few decades,
however, we have witnessed the rise of a dualist system of criminal
procedure, with statutes making up a sizeable portion of the rules. This
increasing codification raises several important questions: Is the legislative
regime for regulating searches and seizures better than the judicial regime?
Are legislatures generally more capable than courts at crafting criminal
procedure rules in the information age? How should courts apply the
Fourth Amendment in a realm where increasingly they are no longer the
only rulemaker?
In his provocative article, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, Professor
Orin Kerr examines the rise of the statutory regime of criminal procedure
when new technologies are involved.1 Kerr goes on to argue that “courts
* Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School; J.D. Yale. Thanks to
Orin Kerr for thoughtful comments on this paper and for being cordial under attack. Maeve
Miller and Carly Grey provided helpful research assistance.
1. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, Constitutional
Myths].
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should place a thumb on the scale in favor of judicial caution when
technology is in flux, and should consider allowing legislatures to provide
the primary rules governing law enforcement investigations involving new
technologies.”2 Kerr suggests, in essence, that courts should back off and
let the codification of the Fourth Amendment continue on its current course.
Kerr’s focus is on new technologies, but the codification of the Fourth
Amendment is expanding more broadly. The first part of this Article argues
that codification has arisen in areas where courts have left a void in Fourth
Amendment protection. These areas include new technologies, but they can
more broadly be understood as involving issues of information privacy.
Whereas courts have readily applied the Fourth Amendment for physical
searches, tangible items, and actual trespasses, data presents a difficult
issue, because it is often obtained in less physical ways that do not involve
entering places or rummaging through things. Data often exists apart from
the subject, and is frequently in the possession of others. Codification has
arisen in these areas because of courts’ difficulty in applying the Fourth
Amendment to information—whether in high-tech form (computer
searches) or low-tech form (records held by companies).
Nevertheless, Kerr’s focus on technology captures a large area of the
codification of the Fourth Amendment. His normative claim is that
legislatures are more capable than courts of making the rules in this area.3
It is here that Kerr’s argument goes significantly astray. Certainly, the
codified regime is better than no Fourth Amendment protection, and since it
has arisen in areas largely left unprotected by the courts, it has filled a void.
But Kerr believes that courts should allow the legislatures to take such a
role, and in this regard, he seemingly endorses the trend of courts leaving
areas outside of Fourth Amendment protection for legislatures to fill in with
statutory rules. Kerr makes a number of contentions about why legislatures
are better able to address new technologies than courts,4 but these
contentions are based on faulty assumptions that are not well grounded in
either theory or practice.5 This Article examines these legislative rules and
demonstrates their deficiencies when compared to Fourth Amendment
protection.
I. FROM THE CONSTITUTION TO STATUTES
Many countries regulate law enforcement primarily through a legislative
or administrative regime.6 In the United States, however, constitutional
rules provide the basis for a significant number of the rules governing law
enforcement investigations. In particular, three constitutional amendments
2. Id. at 805.
3. Id. at 807-08.
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See Craig M. Bradley, The Failure of the Criminal Procedure Revolution 95-143
(1993).
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in the Bill of Rights—the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments—address
issues of criminal procedure.7
A. The Rise of the Fourth Amendment
Beginning in the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice
Earl Warren, radically transformed criminal procedure. The criminal
procedure revolution centered on the Fourth Amendment, which is the rule
regulating what law enforcement officials can search and seize. The Fourth
Amendment provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.8

The Fourth Amendment potentially can cover a large part of the criminal
investigatory process. For the Warren Court, the Fourth Amendment would
become an enormous piece of the regulatory pie. To play such a role, many
components of the Fourth Amendment had to come together. Piece by
piece they did, with the rule reaching the pinnacle of its potential power in
1967.
First, to regulate law enforcement investigations, the Fourth Amendment
required a large jurisdictional reach. The United States, unlike other
countries, does not have a centralized system of policing. Rather, there are
hundreds of thousands of law enforcement officials at the federal, state, and
local levels.9 For a long time, the Fourth Amendment applied only to
federal officials, who have always constituted a small component of law
enforcement.10 It was not until 1949 that the Fourth Amendment was
incorporated against the states in Wolf v. Colorado.11

7. The Fourth Amendment regulates police investigations. It sets forth the rules for
searches and seizures, and it defines the standards and procedure for obtaining warrants. U.S.
Const. amend. IV. The Fifth Amendment sets forth the rules for police questioning of
suspects, grand juries, double jeopardy, and due process. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Sixth
Amendment contains the rules for the right to counsel, a speedy and public trial, and an
impartial jury, as well as certain rights of defendants at trial (confrontation of witnesses,
compulsory process). U.S. Const. at amend. VI.
8. U.S. Const. at amend. IV.
9. According to Bureau of Justice Statistics, there are 796,518 full-time state and local
law enforcement officers and 93,446 full-time federal law enforcement officials. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm (last visited
Sept. 14, 2005); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/fedle.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2005).
10. Federal law enforcement officials constitute only about ten percent of law
enforcement officials in the United States. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, supra note 9.
11. 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
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Second, the Fourth Amendment needed a meaningful enforcement
mechanism. Today, the principal remedy for a Fourth Amendment
violation is the exclusionary rule. If the police violate the Fourth
Amendment, the evidence obtained by the infringement is suppressed from
the defendant’s criminal trial. The Court originally created the exclusionary
rule in 1914, in Weeks v. United States,12 but the rule only applied to the
federal government. Even after the Fourth Amendment was incorporated
against the states in 1949, its remedy—the exclusionary rule—was not. In
1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,13 the Court finally held that the exclusionary rule
applied to the states.
The third and final component of the Fourth Amendment that was
necessary for it to perform the regulatory role the Warren Court envisioned
was the scope of its applicability. “Applicability” refers to those particular
law enforcement activities that the Fourth Amendment covers. The Fourth
Amendment applies to a law enforcement activity whenever there is a
“search” or a “seizure.”14 If the Fourth Amendment applies, then it requires
that the search or seizure be “reasonable,”15 which in many circumstances
means that law enforcement officials must first obtain a warrant supported
by probable cause. There are, of course, many instances when the Fourth
Amendment does not require a warrant or probable cause. In all cases,
however, the Fourth Amendment requires that the search or seizure be
“reasonable.” If the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a particular law
enforcement activity, then it does not require any limitations on that
activity.
The problem facing the Warren Court was that, under existing
interpretations, the Fourth Amendment had limited applicability. In 1928,
in Olmstead v. United States,16 the Court concluded that wiretapping did
not trigger Fourth Amendment protections because the government did not
trespass inside a person’s home: “The Amendment does not forbid what
was done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure. The
evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.
There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”17 Under this
interpretation, the Fourth Amendment protected a person’s home from
being intruded upon by government officials, a person’s letters from being
opened, and a person’s papers from being seized.18 The Olmstead Court
understood privacy violations as physical intrusions. Therefore, the

12. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
13. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
14. See U.S. Const. amend. IV.
15. See U.S. Const. amend. IV.
16. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
17. Id. at 464.
18. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (holding that one’s personal papers
and documents were protected by the Fourth Amendment); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 717
(1877) (holding that sealed letters were protected by the Fourth Amendment).
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wiretapping in Olmstead did not implicate privacy concerns because the
government did not trespass into the home.
In 1967, the Warren Court reversed Olmstead in Katz v. United States.19
Katz appeared to indicate a profound shift in Fourth Amendment analysis.
Whereas the Court had previously applied the Fourth Amendment only in
instances involving physical trespasses or the rummaging through of
possessions or documents, the Katz Court boldly eliminated these tangible
boundaries:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.20

The Court’s current approach to applying the Fourth Amendment
emerges from a concurring opinion by Justice John Harlan in Katz, who
stated that applicability of the Fourth Amendment should turn on whether
(1) a person exhibits an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and (2)
“the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”21 At least in theory, Fourth Amendment applicability can be
quite broad—indeed, it can apply whenever there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
In 1967, with these three components in place—jurisdiction
encompassing all law enforcement officials, a powerful enforcement
mechanism, and a broad scope of applicability—the Fourth Amendment
was poised to become the primary rule to regulate law enforcement
investigations. Conventional wisdom has it that the Fourth Amendment did
achieve such a role—although perhaps only in potential, for no sooner than
all three components were in place, the Fourth Amendment began its
decline.
B. The Decline of the Fourth Amendment
Katz purported to usher in a wide scope of Fourth Amendment coverage
based on a broad understanding of privacy. Instead of expanding its
understanding of privacy, however, the Court merely shifted its view,
conceiving of privacy as a form of total secrecy—a conception I have
referred to as the “secrecy paradigm.”22 Under this view, a privacy
invasion only occurs if a deep secret is uncovered. Therefore, if somebody
could conceivably have peeked in on a person’s property or if a person
revealed information to another, there can be no expectation of privacy.
19. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
22. See Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the
Information Age 42 (2004) [hereinafter Solove, Digital Person].
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In a series of cases from 1983-1989, the Court held that visual or video
surveillance in public falls outside of the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. The police can fly above one’s home and inspect one’s
backyard or even any structures that have openings in their roofs.23 The
police can use sensory enhancement technology to magnify images that are
exposed to the public, even if they could not detect them with the naked
eye.24 The Court also concluded that a physical tracking device that
monitored the movements of a person in public was not covered by the
Fourth Amendment.25 According to the Court, a “person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another.”26
Another limitation in Fourth Amendment applicability is the “third party
doctrine,” which provides that, if information is possessed or known by
third parties, then a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy
regarding such information.27 For example, in 1976, in United States v.
Miller,28 federal law enforcement officials sought a person’s financial
records by subpoenaing them from his bank.29 The banks turned over the
information.30 The bank customer argued that the Fourth Amendment
applied to his records and that the government needed a search warrant to
obtain them.31 The Court, however, disagreed, and concluded that the
Fourth Amendment did not apply because the customer lacked a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his bank records.32 According to the Court’s
reasoning, “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government
authorities.”33 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that “[a]ll of the documents
obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips, contain only
information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their
employees in the ordinary course of business.”34
Three years later, in 1979, the Court held in Smith v. Maryland35 that the
Fourth Amendment did not apply to pen registers—devices that recorded
23. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (upholding a helicopter inspection of a
greenhouse missing a few roof panels from a helicopter); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986) (upholding a flyover inspection of a backyard from a flyover).
24. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
25. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983).
26. Id. at 281.
27. See generally Computer Crime and Intellectual Prop. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Manual on Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal
Investigations § I.B.3 (2001), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/sdsmanual2002.htm
[hereinafter DOJ Manual] (written by Orin Kerr).
28. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
29. Id. at 437-38.
30. Id. at 438.
31. Id. at 438-39.
32. Id. at 441-43.
33. Id. at 443.
34. Id. at 442.
35. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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the phone numbers a person dialed. Because these devices were installed at
the phone company, rather than inside a person’s home, and because people
“know that they must convey numerical information to the phone
company,” they cannot “harbor any general expectation that the numbers
they dial will remain secret.”36
The third party doctrine presents one of the most serious threats to
privacy in the digital age. Today, a multitude of companies have records of
personal information. Internet service providers (“ISPs”) have information
that connects a person’s identity to pseudonymous postings on the Internet.
Bookstores and merchants such as Amazon.com keep extensive records of
every purchase a person makes. The government no longer needs to enter a
person’s home to see what they have bought—it can get the data from the
records of the companies that sold them the items. The government can
find out whom a person has been talking to by examining ISP records and
phone records. In the Information Age, so much of what we do is recorded
by third parties that the Court’s third party doctrine increasingly renders the
Fourth Amendment ineffective in protecting people’s privacy against
government information gathering.37
How should the decline of the Fourth Amendment be understood? One
part of the explanation is that the Supreme Court has been backing away
from the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution, as the Court today
is far more conservative than the Warren Court. But the Court’s narrow
scope of Fourth Amendment protection can also be understood as being
rooted in a flawed conception of privacy. The Court has moved from one
impoverished understanding of privacy to another. Back in the days of
Olmstead, the Court viewed privacy in terms of physical invasions—for
example, probing baggage and searching homes and tangible things.38 Katz
recognized that, as in the case of wiretapping, a person’s privacy could be
invaded even though there was not an actual physical invasion. But the
Court then latched onto another conception of privacy—the secrecy
paradigm—which has proven to be equally, if not more, restrictive than the
Court’s conception of privacy in Olmstead.

36. Id. at 743.
37. See Solove, Digital Person, supra note 22, at 200-03. Because so many investigatory
technologies, tools, and techniques fall outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment,
commentators have long lamented the waning of Fourth Amendment protection. Morgan
Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Technology and the
Fourth Amendment, 72 Miss. L.J. 5, 49 (2002); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’
Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 Minn. L.
Rev. 1325, 1326 (2002); Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth
Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86
Minn. L. Rev. 1393, 1411 (2002); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the
Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 125, 130-33 (2002). For more articles, see Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1,
at 802, 803 & n.7.
38. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
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C. The Rise of the Statutes
Enter Congress. The rules regulating government investigations have
increasingly been those of federal statutes, not Fourth Amendment law.
Although the third party doctrine eliminated Fourth Amendment protection
from a wide range of government information-gathering activities,
numerous federal statutes now fill the void. Wiretapping, for example,
despite being covered by the Fourth Amendment, is largely regulated
through the Wiretap Act.39
Some of the federal statutes were enacted in response to the Court’s
failure to apply the Fourth Amendment to particular situations.40 Other
statues were primarily enacted to protect consumer privacy and regulate
various businesses, but they also contain provisions for government access
to records and personal information.41 A brief tour of these statutes
demonstrates that they are far from a trivial part of criminal procedure.
Indeed, statutory law is becoming increasingly relevant in the Information
Age.
1. Electronic Surveillance Law
In most circumstances, statutes have filled the gaps left by the Fourth
Amendment. The Wiretap Act, however, is one of the rare statutes that
regulates in an area that the Court has found to be within the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. The original version of the Wiretap Act
was enacted as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
in 1968.42 This was one year after Katz had concluded that the Fourth
Amendment applied to wiretapping43 and Berger v. New York had set forth
the constitutional requirements for wiretapping.44 Berger and Katz were
used “as a guide in drafting Title III.”45
The Wiretap Act has all but supplanted the Fourth Amendment in
regulating wiretaps, because the protections of the Wiretap Act exceed
those of the Fourth Amendment in many circumstances. For example,
unlike the Fourth Amendment, the Wiretap Act’s applicability does not
hinge upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.46 Furthermore, while the
Fourth Amendment only applies to government officials, the Wiretap Act
39. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000); see also infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 52-78 and accompanying text.
41. See infra Part II.C.2.
42. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102520).
43. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also supra notes 19-21 and
accompanying text.
44. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1967) (stating that wiretap orders must
particularly describe the kinds of conversations sought to be overhead and must have a
termination date).
45. S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 214-18 (1969).
46. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511.
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applies to government officials as well as to private parties.47 Warrants
under the Wiretap Act have certain protections that Fourth Amendment
warrants lack, and Orin Kerr aptly refers to Wiretap Act warrants as
“‘super’ search warrant[s].”48 For example, beyond requiring probable
cause, they require a finding that “normal investigative procedures have
been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if
tried or to be too dangerous.”49 Only certain high-ranking government
officials are permitted to apply for warrants under the Wiretap Act.50
The Stored Communications Act protects communications stored by
third parties, including ISP records. The Stored Communications Act was
enacted as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) of
1986.51 The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail stored with third
parties, or in subscriber information stored with an ISP. There is an
argument that this information, because it is maintained by a third party,
would fall under the third party doctrine.52 The Stored Communications
Act protects unread e-mail awaiting download by the user that is
temporarily stored at one’s ISP.53 In addition, the government must obtain
a warrant to acquire communications stored for 180 days or less.54 After
180 days, however, the protection drops to a mere subpoena or court
order.55
The Stored Communications Act also regulates ISP customer records.
ISP records contain information that links a customer’s screen name (online
pseudonym) with her real identity. These records also include Internet
session times, addresses, phone numbers, and billing data.56 To obtain ISP
records, the government needs to secure a court order under the Stored
Communications Act, which does not require a showing of probable
cause.57 Rather, the government only has to demonstrate “specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds” to believe

47. Id. § 2511(1).
48. Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother
That Isn’t, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 607, 621 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr, Big Brother].
49. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c).
50. Id. § 2516.
51. Id. §§ 2510-2522.
52. See generally supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).
54. Id. § 2703(a).
55. Id. § 2703(b).
56. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(C).
57. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(B)(ii).
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communications are “relevant” to the criminal investigation.58 The Stored
Communications Act does not have an exclusionary rule.59
The Pen Register Act regulates government access to pen registers and
trap and trace devices,60 which, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court
held are outside the coverage of the Fourth Amendment.61 Under the Pen
Register Act, the government must obtain a court order to use a pen register
or trap and trace device.62 However, a court order differs significantly from
a search warrant. The order requires that the government certify that “the
information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to
an ongoing investigation.”63 This standard falls well short of probable
cause, as relevance is much easier to establish. Moreover, courts have no
discretion; when government officials make the certification, the order must
be granted.64 There is no exclusionary rule under the Pen Register Act.
Congress has also regulated foreign intelligence surveillance. In 1972,
the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment standard for national
security intelligence remained an open question. In United States v. United
States District Court,65 a case that has become known as the “Keith case,”
the Court ruled that, although surveillance for domestic criminal law
enforcement was protected by ordinary Fourth Amendment rules, “domestic
security surveillance may involve different policy and practical
considerations from the surveillance of ‘ordinary crime.’”66 The Court also
noted that “[d]ifferent standards” other than a warrant “may be compatible
with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the
legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the
protected rights of our citizens.”67 Moreover, the Court explicitly left open
the question of the surveillance of “foreign powers,” opining that
warrantless surveillance under these limited circumstances “may be
constitutional.”68
Keith left more questions than answers. In part to fill the gaps left by
Keith, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”)

58. Id. § 2703(d). If the government does not want to provide prior notice to the
subscriber that it is seeking the information, it must obtain a warrant. Id. § 2703(b).
However, in a number of circumstances, notice can be delayed for up to three months after
information has been obtained. Id. § 2705.
59. United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1111 (D. Kan. 2000); United States
v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (W.D. Va. 1999).
60. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3124.
61. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 3123(a)(1).
65. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
66. Id. at 322.
67. Id. at 322-23.
68. Id. at 322 n.20.
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of 1978.69 FISA’s purpose is to create a regulatory regime for foreign
intelligence gathering.70 FISA creates a secret court of eleven judges to
issue court orders for government foreign intelligence-gathering activities.71
FISA orders are granted if there is probable cause to believe that the
monitored party is a “foreign power” or “an agent of a foreign power.”72
Evidence obtained under a FISA order can be used in a regular criminal
prosecution.73
Very soon after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress
passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (“USA-PATRIOT
Act”) of 2001.74 The USA-PATRIOT Act made a number of changes to
the federal statutes discussed above. It expanded the definition of pen
registers from “numbers dialed . . . on the telephone line” to all “dialing,
routing, addressing, or signaling information.”75 This expansion means that
the Pen Register Act now covers the addressing information on e-mails,
Internet Protocol addresses (“IP addresses”), and Uniform Resource
Locators (“URLs”).
The USA-PATRIOT Act also expanded the information that could be
obtained under the Stored Communications Act, adding “records of session
times and durations,” “any temporarily assigned network address,” and
“any credit card or bank account number” used for payment.76 Moreover,
the USA-PATRIOT Act expanded the scope of FISA. FISA originally
applied only when “the purpose” of the investigation was to gather foreign
intelligence.77 This limited FISA’s scope to when the primary purpose of
an investigation was foreign intelligence gathering. FISA now applies
whenever foreign intelligence gathering is “a significant purpose” of the

69. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§
1801-1811 (2000)).
70. The purpose of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) was to erect a
“secure framework by which the Executive Branch may conduct legitimate electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes within the context of this Nation’s
commitment to privacy and individual rights.” S. Rep. No. 604 (1977), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3916.
71. Originally, there were seven judges on the court, but the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
(“USA-PATRIOT Act”) raised the number to eleven. See USA-PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No.
107-56, § 208(i), 115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)). For
more details about the workings of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”), see
Benjamin Wittes, Inside America’s Most Secretive Court, 143 N.J. L.J. 777 (1996).
72. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2000).
73. Id. § 1806(b).
74. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2000), amended by USA-PATRIOT Act § 216, 18 U.S.C.A. §
3127(3) (West 2005).
76. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(c)(2).
77. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A).
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investigation.78 This means that foreign intelligence gathering only needs
to be one of the goals of an investigation, thereby allowing the government
to use FISA to obtain information for criminal prosecution purposes.
2. Regulation of Government Access to Records
In the void left by the third party doctrine, Congress has established a
regime to regulate government access to records. Such a regime has been
constructed piecemeal.
Many of the provisions that address law
enforcement access appear in various statutes that primarily deal with
consumer and financial privacy, and are not primarily devoted to law
enforcement issues.
In 1978, two years after the Supreme Court concluded in United States v.
Miller that the Fourth Amendment did not cover bank records, Congress
responded by passing the Right to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”).79 The
RFPA requires the government to use a subpoena to access financial
information.80 The subpoena requires a “reason to believe that the records
sought are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.”81 People must
be given prior notice of the subpoena so they can challenge it in court;
however, in many circumstances, the government can delay notice.82
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) of 1970, although primarily a
consumer privacy protection statute, contains provisions regarding law
enforcement access to credit records.83 Credit reporting agencies maintain
detailed records on nearly every American citizen. These records include
not only financial information, but also data about people’s lifestyles,
spending habits, and anything else relevant to creditors.84 Under the
FCRA, a consumer reporting agency “may furnish identifying information
respecting any consumer, limited to his name, address, former addresses,
places of employment, and former places of employment, to a governmental
agency.”85 When the government wants to obtain other information, it must
seek a court order or grand jury subpoena.86 Furthermore, the Federal

78. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B), amended by USA-PATRIOT Act § 204, 18 U.S.C.A. §
1804(a)(7)(B).
79. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95630, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000)).
80. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422. For more information on the Right to Financial
Privacy (“RFPA”), see George B. Trubow & Dennis L. Hudson, The Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978: New Protection from Federal Intrusion, 12 J. Marshall J. Prac. & Proc.
487 (1979).
81. 12 U.S.C. § 3407.
82. Id. § 3409.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
84. Solove, Digital Person, supra note 22, at 21.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1681f.
86. Id. § 1681b(a)(1).
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Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) can request a list of all financial institutions
where a person maintains an account.87
The Family Education Right to Privacy Act (“FERPA”) of 1974 protects
the privacy of school records, which can include extensive information
about students.88 Law enforcement officials may obtain these records
“pursuant to any lawfully issued subpoena.”89
The Cable Communications Policy Act (“CCPA”) of 1984, which
regulates the privacy of a person’s records with her cable television
company, is another statute designed to protect consumer privacy.90 Like
many others, the CCPA also contains a provision for law enforcement
access to cable records.91 The government must establish “clear and
convincing evidence that the subject of the information is reasonably
suspected of engaging in criminal activity and that the information sought
would be material evidence in the case.”92 People can “appear and contest”
the court order.93 There is, however, no exclusionary rule under the CCPA.
The Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”) of 1988,94 primarily a
consumer privacy statute, enables law enforcement officials to obtain a
person’s videotape rental records from her video store pursuant to a grand
jury subpoena or court order.95 Similarly, the regulations promulgated
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)
of 199696 permit law enforcement officials to access medical records with a
court order or subpoena.97 Law enforcement officials need only ask for the
information “for the purpose of identifying or locating a suspect, fugitive,
material witness, or missing person.”98
3. Searches Involving Communicative Material
Congress has also regulated searches involving communicative material,
such as documents used for the purpose of engaging in journalism or public
communication, as well as correspondence and letters in the mail. In 1978,
in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,99 police searched the offices of a newspaper
to find photographs of people involved in a demonstration.100 The
newspaper was not involved in the demonstration and was not suspected of
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. § 1681u.
20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000).
Id. § 1232g(b)(2)(B).
47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
Id. § 551(h).
Id. § 551(h)(1).
Id. § 551(h)(2).
18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000).
Id. § 2710(b)(2)(C).
29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1183, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2000); see 45 C.F.R. § 160-64 (2004).
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(A).
Id. § 164.512(f)(2).
436 U.S. 547 (1978).
Id. at 551.
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criminal activity.101 The Court concluded that the law enforcement
officials could conduct the search if the officials had probable cause to
believe that evidence of a crime would be located at the property.102 The
Court concluded that the requirements of a warrant “should afford sufficient
protection” against these harms.103
In response to Zurcher, Congress passed the Privacy Protection Act
(“PPA”) of 1980.104 The PPA restricts the search or seizure of “any work
product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a
purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other
similar form of public communication.”105 The PPA requires that the
government obtain a subpoena for work product materials, allowing the
opposing party to challenge the request in court and to produce the
requested documents without having the police search the premises.
Statutory law also regulates the search and seizure of postal mail.106 In
this area, the Supreme Court in 1877 held that the Fourth Amendment
requires a search warrant in order for law enforcement officials to open
letters and parcels.107 A federal statute overlaps with this holding, requiring
a search warrant before law enforcement officials can open a letter.108
II. CONGRESS VERSUS THE COURTS
The previous part demonstrated that, for a significant portion of criminal
investigations, especially those involving information, a regime of federal
statutes—rather than the Fourth Amendment—governs. Orin Kerr is one of
the few to have analyzed the implications of this profound shift from
constitutional to statutory regulation of government investigations.109 Kerr
contends that legislative rules are in many respects preferable to judicial
ones, and he goes on to argue that “the legislative branch rather than the
judiciary should create the primary investigative rules when technology is
Legislatures, according to Kerr, “offer significant
changing.”110
institutional advantages over courts.”111 Accordingly, “[c]ourts should

101. Id.
102. Id. at 554.
103. Id. at 565.
104. Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2000aa (2000)).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a).
106. 39 U.S.C. § 3623(d) (2000).
107. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
108. 39 U.S.C. § 3623(d).
109. Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1, at 807.
110. Id. at 806; see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and
Freedom in an Anxious Age 210-11 (2004) (“Congress is better suited than the courts to
strike a reasonable balance between liberty and security”) (discussing Kerr’s thesis).
111. Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1, at 807-08.
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recognize their institutional limitations and remain cautious until the
relevant technology and its applications stabilize.”112
What does Kerr mean by invoking the language of judicial “caution”?
The language is that of deference, which is also referred to as judicial
restraint. Elsewhere, I have critiqued the underpinnings used to justify
judicial deference, concluding that “[d]eference is the negation of critical
inquiry.”113 Kerr is unclear in his article about what precisely judges
should do when faced with applying the Fourth Amendment to a new
technology. One interpretation of Kerr’s call for “caution” is for judges to
be more reluctant to find the Fourth Amendment applicable to new
technologies—in other words, to conclude that, when law enforcement
activities involve new technologies, they fall outside of the Fourth
Amendment’s protection. Because Fourth Amendment applicability turns
on whether or not there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, perhaps Kerr
is suggesting that courts should be reluctant to find a reasonable expectation
of privacy. As Kerr notes, “[j]udicial deference has often invited
Congressional regulation.”114 Therefore, the most deferential position
courts can take is simply to hold that the Fourth Amendment does not
apply, and allow Congress to fill the void.
The question becomes the following: Should courts be more bold in
expanding the scope of the Fourth Amendment to encompass new
technologies? Or should courts cautiously hold off and allow legislatures to
craft the regulation? The next part of this Article argues that Kerr is too
quick to extol the virtues of Congress and that he is especially misguided in
suggesting that courts take a back seat to legislatures in creating criminal
procedure rules for new technologies.
A. Are Legislative Rules Better than Judicial Rules?
Kerr makes a number of arguments in support of his call for judicial
restraint. Kerr’s key contentions are that (1) legislatures create rules that
are more comprehensive, balanced, clear, and flexible; (2) legislatures are
better able to keep up with technological change; and (3) legislatures are
more adept at understanding complex new technologies.115 The following
sections examine each contention in turn.

112. Id. at 808.
113. Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of
Rights, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 941, 1020 (1999) [hereinafter Solove, The Darkest Domain].
114. Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1, at 806.
115. Specifically, he argues as follows: “When technologies are new and their impact
remains uncertain, statutory rules governing law enforcement powers will tend to be more
sophisticated, comprehensive, forward-thinking, and flexible than rules created by the
judicial branch.” Id. at 859-60.
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1. Creating a Comprehensive and Balanced Set of Rules
Kerr argues that a key goal in drafting criminal procedure rules is to
create “a rule-structure that simultaneously respects privacy interests and
According to Kerr, unlike courts,
law enforcement needs.”116
“[l]egislatures can enact comprehensive rules based on expert input and can
update them frequently as technology changes.”117 Moreover, legislative
rules “are more nuanced, clear, and . . . optimize the critical balance
between privacy and public safety more effectively when technology is in
flux.”118
However, there seems to be no reason why a statutory regime will
inevitably be any more comprehensive, balanced, or clear than a regime
based on Fourth Amendment principles. When the Fourth Amendment
covers a particular law enforcement activity, it provides a set of rules to
regulate it. Once a law enforcement activity falls within the Fourth
Amendment’s regulatory regime, courts will examine whether the search or
seizure was “reasonable.”119 A search with a warrant supported by
probable cause is generally reasonable. Only on very rare occasions are
searches pursuant to a valid warrant unreasonable.120 A search without a
valid warrant is often deemed unreasonable. This is known as the “per se
warrant rule.”121
Warrants are a judicial authorization for a particular search. Warrants
must be supported by probable cause, which exists when there is
“reasonably trustworthy information” that the search will turn up evidence
of a crime.122 The purpose of a warrant is to have an independent party
(judges or magistrates) ensure that government officials really do have
probable cause to conduct a search.
Kerr criticizes the Fourth Amendment rules as inflexible, but in reality
they show a remarkable degree of flexibility. First, the warrant requirement
balances privacy interests and law enforcement needs by allowing searches
and seizures to occur only after law enforcement officials justify them
before a judge or magistrate.
Second, in situations where warrants and probable cause do not work
well, the Court has made exceptions. Indeed, there are numerous
exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements, such as Terry
116. Id. at 861.
117. Id. at 807.
118. Id. at 806.
119. See U.S. Const. amend. IV.
120. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (operating on the defendant to retrieve a
bullet inside his body was an unreasonable search, even though there was a valid warrant for
it).
121. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1083, 1118 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Digital Dossiers].
122. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
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stops, exigent circumstances, and “special needs” in schools and
workplaces.123 These exceptions allow the courts to accommodate a wide
range of government investigative activity within the protective framework
of the Fourth Amendment.
In contrast, the statutory regime that Kerr extols has many deficiencies
that caution against Kerr’s enthusiasm for legislative rules. When the
statutes are examined as a whole—as an alternative regulatory regime to the
Fourth Amendment—there are many severe problems that refute Kerr’s
belief in the superiority of a legislative regime.124
First, Congress’s statutes lack effective remedies because the federal
statutes often lack exclusionary rules.
For example, there is no
exclusionary rule to protect e-mail under the Wiretap Act,125 and the Stored
Communications Act and Pen Register Act both lack an exclusionary
rule.126 Kerr, in fact, wrote an article lamenting exactly this fact.127 Most
of the statutes regulating law enforcement access to records held by third
parties also lack an exclusionary rule.128 As a result, there is often little
incentive for criminal defendants to challenge violations of these statutes.
Second, there are many gaps in the statutes. Consider electronic
surveillance law, for example. The Wiretap Act fails to cover silent video
surveillance.129 As one court observed,
123. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719-20 (1987) (holding that, when a
government employer conducts a warrantless search, a court “must balance the invasion of
the employee’s legitimate expectation of privacy against the government’s need for
supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace”); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 340 (1984) (stating that a warrant requirement is unsuited to the school
environment, despite children’s expectations of privacy); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968) (holding that an investigatory stop without a warrant is justified when a police officer
is “able to point to specific and articulable facts which . . . reasonably warrant that
intrusion”).
124. In his reply, Kerr contends that I unfairly pit an idealized Fourth Amendment regime
against the statutory regime. In other words, I am comparing a Fourth Amendment regime
as if the courts had applied the Fourth Amendment to various new technologies against the
statutory regime as is. But Kerr’s contention is normative and proscriptive in that he
recommends that going forward, legislatures, and not courts, should be the primary
rulemakers. He criticizes scholars who call for the courts to expand Fourth Amendment
applicability. The current status quo reveals areas where the courts refused to apply the
Fourth Amendment and where legislatures became involved. I aim to ask, are we better off
with the void as filled by the legislative rules, or would we be better off had the Fourth
Amendment been interpreted to encompass a particular law enforcement activity? I believe
in many instances, the latter would be better.
125. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
126. See Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2000); Pen Register Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000).
127. Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression
Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 Hastings L.J. 805 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr,
Fog].
128. See generally supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 539 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504,
508 (2d Cir. 1986).
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Television surveillance is identical in its indiscriminate character to
wiretapping and bugging. It is even more invasive of privacy, just as a
strip search is more invasive than a pat-down search, but it is not more
indiscriminate: the microphone is as “dumb” as the television camera;
both devices pick up anything within their electronic reach, however
irrelevant to the investigation.130

As another court observed, “[V]ideo surveillance can be vastly more
intrusive [than audio surveillance], as demonstrated by the surveillance in
this case that recorded a person masturbating before the hidden camera.”131
Beyond video surveillance, there are numerous technologies Congress
has failed to regulate. Global positioning systems enable people’s
movements to be tracked wherever they go.132 Facial recognition systems
can enable surveillance photos and videos to be scanned to identify
particular people based on their facial features.133 Satellite technology may
be used to examine practically any open area on earth.134 Radio frequency
identification (“RFID”) involves tags placed into products, objects, and
even human beings that emit a decipherable signal.135 As this technology
develops and tags can be read at greater distances, RFID might be used to
track people’s movements.
Congress has not passed statutes to address the privacy implications of
any of these technologies. Nor has Congress passed a law to regulate video
surveillance of citizens. Ironically, FISA regulates video surveillance, but
the ECPA does not,136 meaning that the video surveillance of a foreign spy
receives more federal statutory protection than that of a U.S. citizen.137 Nor
has Congress regulated the use of tracking devices, key logging devices, or
other new technologies.
Kerr critiques the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kyllo v. United States138 as
the exemplar of the shortcomings of judicial rules for regulating
130. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 1984) (emphasis omitted).
131. United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1437 (10th Cir. 1990).
132. Brendan I. Koerner, Spy Games: From Black Boxes to GPS Devices, Your Car is
Recording Your Every Move, Reader’s Dig., July 2004, at 80.
133. Daniel J. Solove & Marc Rotenberg, Information Privacy Law 313 (2003).
134. See Mark Monmonier, Spying with Maps: Surveillance Technology and the Future
of Privacy (2002).
135. Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2055,
2060 (2004); Jonathan Krim, Embedding Their Hopes in RFID: Tagging Technology
Promises Efficiency but Raises Privacy Issue, Wash. Post, June 23, 2004, at E1.
136. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
137. FISA requires that the government submit “a detailed description of the nature of the
information sought and the type of communication or activities to be subjected to the
surveillance” and a certification “that such information cannot reasonably be obtained by
normal investigative techniques.” 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)-(7) (2000). For cases holding that
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) does not cover silent video
surveillance, see United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1994), United States v.
Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 539 (9th Cir. 1992), and United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504,
508 (2d Cir. 1986).
138. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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technology.139 Kyllo involved the use of thermal sensors by law
enforcement officials to detect marijuana heat lamps inside a person’s
home.140 The Court held that the Fourth Amendment required a search
warrant before using such devices to detect activities inside a person’s
home.141 Kerr argues that “the [Kyllo] opinion captures the prevailing
zeitgeist about law, technology, and privacy. When technology threatens
privacy, the thinking goes, the courts and the Constitution should offer the
primary response.”142
Kyllo sets forth the Court’s current approach to analyzing sensory
enhancement technology: When the technology is not in general public use
and is used to detect activities in the home, a warrant is required.143 This
does leave open many questions: What happens when technology enters
general public use? What about uses beyond the home?
Certainly, Kyllo has problems in articulating a clear approach to when
sensory enhancement technology can be employed. But was Congress any
better? Congress has never passed a law addressing sensory enhancement
technologies, despite having had a long time to do so. Back in 1986, the
Supreme Court held in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States144 that the
Fourth Amendment did not apply to highly magnified photographs taken
from a high-tech aerial camera at very high altitudes. The Court reasoned
as follows: “The mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at
least to the degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems.”145
The Dow Chemical case raised a host of questions about what limits, if any,
should be placed on sensory enhancement technology. The Court
cautiously refused to impose a rule to regulate such technologies. Congress
could have responded with legislation, but it did not. There is little reason,
therefore, to assume that if the courts hold that the Fourth Amendment is
inapplicable to a new technology, Congress will swoop in and save the day.
Beyond electronic surveillance law, the law regulating government
access to records held by third parties also has tremendous gaps. Although
the RFPA and the FCRA regulate government access to financial data,146
there are many situations where financial data is unprotected, such as when
the information is held by employers, landlords, merchants, creditors,
database companies, and others.147 HIPAA regulates access to medical
records, but only when in the hands of certain third parties (doctors,

139. Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1, at 802.
140. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
141. Id. at 40.
142. Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1, at 802.
143. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
144. 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
145. Id. at 228.
146. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000); Fair Credit
Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (2000).
147. See Solove, Digital Person, supra note 22, at 206.
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hospitals, insurers, and so on).148 Medical websites containing people’s
personal information are not covered by HIPAA.149 Basically, the problem
is that the statutes focus on who is holding the information, rather than on
the information itself. Thus, the same piece of information can be protected
if held by one third party and completely unprotected if held by a different
third party. Some third parties that have extensive information about
individuals are not covered at all, including bookstores, merchants,
restaurants, employers, and other businesses. There are numerous database
companies that compile extensive dossiers on individuals, yet existing
statutes often do not cover law enforcement access to this data.
Second, beyond enormous gaps in protection, the statutes offer far less
protection than the Fourth Amendment. Most permit law enforcement
access to information based only on a court order or subpoena, rather than
on a warrant.150 Prosecutors, not judges, issue the subpoenas.151 Professor
William Stuntz observed as follows: “[W]hile searches typically require
probable cause or reasonable suspicion and sometimes require a warrant,
subpoenas require nothing, save that the subpoena not be unreasonably
burdensome to its target. Few burdens are deemed unreasonable.”152 The
court orders required by the statutes also require far less than probable
cause. Typically, mere “relevance” to an ongoing criminal investigation is
all that such statutes require.153
Thus, in areas where the courts have backed off and left a void that
Congress has attempted to fill, the statutes have not, in large part, measured
up. Given a choice, it seems that a better balance between privacy interests
and law enforcement needs could have been reached if the courts had held
that the Fourth Amendment covered a particular law enforcement activity.
Thus, we could have the courts take Kerr’s advice and exercise caution and
148. Doctors, hospitals, and insurers are “covered entities” under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) regulations, and therefore the rules apply to
them. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2004).
149. Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, Exposed Online: Why the New Federal Health
Privacy Regulation Doesn’t Offer Much Protection to Internet Users 7 (2001), available at
http://pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_HPP_HealthPriv_report.pdf.
150. See Solove, Digital Person, supra note 22, at 202-09; see also Daniel J. Solove, Data
Privacy and the Vanishing Fourth Amendment, Champion Mag., May 2005, at 20.
151. Louis Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 107, 152 (1986).
152. William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 842, 857-58 (2000).
153. See Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2000) (providing that law
enforcement officials can obtain Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) records with “specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the records or
other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation”);
Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (2000) (providing that law enforcement officials can
obtain pen register information if “the information likely to be obtained . . . is relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation.”); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3407(1)
(2000) (providing that law enforcement officials can obtain financial information if they
have “reason to believe that the records sought are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement
inquiry”).
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restraint, allowing Congress to craft the rules, or we could have the courts
be more willing to expand the coverage of the Fourth Amendment. Where
the courts have left open areas for legislative rules to fill in, Congress has
created an uneven fabric of protections that is riddled with holes and that
has weak protections in numerous places. Therefore, Kerr’s claim that
legislatures create more comprehensive and balanced rules than courts is
simply not borne out by the evidence.
Another of Kerr’s reasons for preferring legislatures to courts is his view
that legislatures will craft clearer rules than courts. Kerr is particularly keen
on avoiding unclear rules, and he lists “rule clarity” as a key goal for a
criminal procedure system.154 Kerr argues that “[u]nclear rules mean
unclear limits on government power, increasing the likelihood of abuses by
aggressive government officials.”155 According to Kerr, legislative rules
“are more nuanced, clear, and . . . optimize the critical balance between
privacy and public safety more effectively when technology is in flux.”156
Yet the rules of the ECPA are notoriously confusing and unclear, as Kerr
himself frequently points out in his writings.157 If electronic surveillance
law were clear, Kerr would have a lot less to write about. He has written
countless articles seeking to explain the meaning of the electronic
surveillance laws,158 and has built his reputation as one of the few people
on the planet who can actually make sense of the law. It is no wonder that
Kerr prefers the statutes; this is his home turf. As for clarity, there are
many open questions under electronic surveillance law, and many
provisions subject to conflicting interpretations. Kerr really does not point
us to a clearer regime; rather, he simply points us to one that he understands
better.
Furthermore, federal statutes are not self-executing, meaning that they
must be interpreted and applied by courts. In reality, Kerr’s argument
concerns only whether Fourth Amendment rules interpreted by judges are
preferable to statutory rules interpreted by judges. In fact, judges have
frequently botched interpreting statutory law, as Kerr repeatedly has
lamented.159 A large part of the problem is that the statutory law is
extremely complicated. For instance, Kerr’s favorite law, the ECPA, is
154. Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1, at 861.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 806.
157. See infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
158. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s
Guide to Amending It, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, User’s Guide];
Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 279
(2005); Kerr, Big Brother, supra note 48; Kerr, Fog, supra note 127.
159. See, e.g., Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 158, at 1208; Kerr, Fog, supra note 127, at
807 (complaining that ECPA “remains unusually obscure” and that it “remains a fog”). Kerr
decries that the Stored Communications Act “remains poorly understood. Courts,
legislators, and even legal scholars have had a very hard time making sense of the [Stored
Communications Act]. The statute is dense and confusing . . . .” Kerr, User’s Guide, supra
note 158, at 1208.
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immensely complicated, and he notes that it is “unusually difficult to
understand.”160 He also observes that the “law of electronic surveillance is
famously complex, if not entirely impenetrable.”161 The problem, then, is
not the Fourth Amendment, but the outdated, overly complex statutes that
courts must apply.
Part of the problem with the complexity of electronic surveillance law
stems from the flexibility that Kerr praises. Kerr commends Congress for
dreaming up eight different kinds of “statutory thresholds” for electronic
surveillance law.162 While this certainly is more flexible, it has also led to
great confusion. Kerr has painstakingly attempted to explain these different
standards, which are readily confused and difficult to figure out.163 Not
only federal officials, but also local law enforcement officials, must
understand these standards. Most local police officers, however, lack the
benefit of having years to study the mysteries of the ECPA.
The problem is that flexibility and clarity are often in conflict. The
multiple exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, which give the Fourth Amendment rules some
flexibility, have been criticized as confusing. As Silas Wasserstrom and
Louis Michael Seidman observe, the per se warrant rule is “so riddled with
exceptions, complexities, and contradictions that it has become a trap for
the unwary.”164
The problems of clarity and flexibility are endemic to all rules, whether
legislative or judicial. An examination of the current law, however, far
from revealing legislative superiority in achieving clarity and flexibility,
demonstrates that both legislatures and courts are for the most part in the
same boat.
2. Keeping Up with Technological Change
Kerr argues that legislatures are better able than courts to craft rules
dealing with changing facts. According to Kerr, courts, unlike legislatures,
“cannot update rules quickly as technology shifts.”165 Kerr argues that a
key difference between legislative and judicial rules is that “legislatures
typically create generally applicable rules ex ante, while courts tend to
create rules ex post in a case-by-case fashion.”166 Kerr goes on to argue
that “legislatures enact generalized rules for the future, whereas courts
resolve disputes settling the rights of parties from a past event. The
160. Kerr, Fog, supra note 127, at 820.
161. Id.
162. Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1, at 872.
163. Kerr, Big Brother, supra note 48, at 620-21 (creating a chart for understanding the
standards).
164. Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 Geo. L.J. 19, 34 (1988).
165. Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1, at 807.
166. Id. at 868.
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difference leads to Fourth Amendment rules that tend to lag behind parallel
statutory rules and current technologies by at least a decade.”167
The same is true, however, for the statutory law. The problem with ex
ante laws is that they cannot anticipate all of the new and changing factual
situations that technology brings about. Ex post rules, in contrast, are often
much better tailored to specific types of technology, because such rules
arise as technology changes, rather than beforehand.
Kerr points to a series of gaps in Fourth Amendment law—areas where
no court has made a determination as to whether the Fourth Amendment
applies to a particular technology. He observes that pen registers “were in
widespread use by the 1960s, but the Supreme Court did not pass on
whether their use violated the Fourth Amendment until 1979.”168 Congress,
however, waited even longer, and did not spring into action until 1986.169
Kerr continues his argument by pointing out that “no Article III court at
any level has decided whether an Internet user has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their e-mails stored with an Internet service provider; whether
encryption creates a reasonable expectation of privacy; or what the Fourth
Amendment implications of . . . Internet surveillance . . . might be.”170
This is true, but has Congress addressed these topics? Congress has yet
to pass a statute addressing whether law enforcement officials must obtain a
warrant or court order to decode encrypted files they have seized.
Regarding privacy in e-mail, the Stored Communications Act is unclear
about the level of protection provided to e-mail that is already read by the
user, but left on the ISP’s server.171 Such a situation is increasing in its
frequency, due to the rise of web-based e-mail systems such as Gmail,
Hotmail, and Yahoo e-mail, where people’s e-mail remains stored at the
server and not deleted after it is read. The Department of Justice takes the
position that read e-mail is “simply a remotely stored file” that can be
obtained with a mere subpoena.172 This position was articulated in a
manual written by none other than Orin Kerr.173 Many other contested
questions of electronic surveillance law remain.174

167. Id.
168. Id. at 869.
169. Id. at 855.
170. Id. at 869.
171. Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1264, 1281 (2004).
172. DOJ Manual, supra note 27, § III.B.
173. See id.
174. For an extensive discussion of numerous contested issues, ambiguities, and problems
in electronic surveillance law, see Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s
Lens, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1375, 1434-38 (2004); Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance:
Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 Ala. L. Rev. 9, 67-69 (2004); Deirdre K.
Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective
on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1557, 1582-98
(2004).
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According to Kerr, legislatures are superior to courts in these situations
because legislatures “can act at any time, even when a technology is new”
and “recent history suggests that legislatures usually act at a surprisingly
early stage, and certainly long before the courts.”175 Such a history is
haphazard at best, as there are numerous forms of technology legislatures
have not acted on. Kerr does not provide any structural reason why
legislatures can act earlier, or why creating a law before technology is fully
understood or developed is necessarily a good thing. Often the problem
with ex ante legislative rules is that technology changes afterwards.
Kerr notes that courts would need to “change the governing rules at
regular intervals” in order to “allow the governing rules to change as needed
over time.”176 He then states that “it’s hard to imagine the courts creating
new rules every few years to keep the law up to date.”177 Congress,
however, has not done a good job of this, and its rules regulating electronic
surveillance are hopelessly out of date. Throughout the entire twentieth
century and continuing on through the present, there have been only a few
times Congress has made major changes in electronic surveillance law: in
1934, 1968, 1978, 1986, and 2001.178
First, in 1934, Congress enacted § 605 of the Federal Communications
Act179 to regulate wiretapping six years after the Court held in Olmstead
that the Fourth Amendment did not apply.180 Although Kerr complains that
the Court took a very long time to address wiretapping, Congress took even
longer. And when it finally did address wiretapping with § 605, the law
was a disaster. Dislike of § 605 was nearly universal.181 Section 605,
which governed wiretapping for longer than any other federal statute, struck
a terrible balance by anyone’s standards. Section 605 requires as follows:
“[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person.”182 Section 605 did not specify how it was to be enforced, and it
took the courts to fix this ambiguity and conclude that evidence obtained in
violation of the Act would be excluded from evidence in federal court.183
The Department of Justice and the FBI interpreted § 605 to prohibit only
175. Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1, at 870.
176. Id. at 873.
177. Id.
178. See infra notes 179-91 and accompanying text.
179. 6 U.S.C. § 605 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000)).
180. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see also supra notes 16-18 and
accompanying text.
181. See Solove, supra note 171, at 1274-75 (“Attorney General Nicholas Katzenback
declared [§ 605] the ‘worst of all possible solutions.’ According to Senate Report 1097,
section 605 ‘serves . . . neither the interests of privacy nor of law enforcement.’”); see also
James G. Carr & Patricia L. Bellia, The Law of Electronic Surveillance § 2.1, at 2-5 (2d ed.
2004).
182. 47 U.S.C. § 605.
183. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937).
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the disclosure of evidence at trial, not the practice of wiretapping itself.184
This enabled FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to wiretap to his heart’s content
so long as he used wiretapping only to blackmail people, rather than to
provide evidence in federal trials.
Second, in 1968, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act to regulate electronic surveillance and reform
the misguided regime of § 605.185 By this time, however, the Court had
already overruled Olmstead and had provided useful guidance to Congress
about what to include in its law in Berger.186
Third, in 1978, Congress enacted FISA to regulate foreign intelligence
gathering.187 FISA created a regime distinct from that of Title III, which
governed domestic surveillance.188
Fourth, in 1986, Congress revised Title III with the ECPA, which was
Congress’s most proactive legislation.189 Although the ECPA was grand in
scope, Congress has done little to modernize the ECPA in the nearly two
decades since its passage.
Finally, in 2001, Congress passed the USA-PATRIOT Act.190 Kerr
trumpets the virtues of legislatures having time to explore the facts and
really understand the technologies, but the USA-PATRIOT Act was rushed
through Congress in great haste.191 Moreover, without the tragic events of
September 11, it is unlikely that Congress would have made any significant
changes to electronic surveillance law in 2001.
This is hardly a regular updating of the law. Although the ECPA has
been amended between 1986 and 2001, Kerr admits elsewhere that these
“subsequent changes have merely nibbled around the edges of the law.”192
For the domestic surveillance regime, there had been a lag of thirty-four
years between § 605 and Title III, eighteen years between Title III and the
ECPA, and fifteen years between the ECPA and the USA-PATRIOT Act.
If anything, this historical record suggests that Congress is actually far
worse than the courts in reacting to new technologies. The ex ante law of
the ECPA that Kerr extols now has many spots where it no longer fits the
technology.193 Since the passage of the ECPA, technology has not sat still.
184. See Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure 260 (3d ed. 2000).
185. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102520 (2000)).
186. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
187. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§
1801-1811 (2000)); see also supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
189. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
190. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62);
see also supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
191. See Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA-PATRIOT Act, 72 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1145 (2004) (describing the history of the USA-PATRIOT Act’s passage,
which occurred less than two months after September 11th).
192. Kerr, Fog, supra note 127, at 814.
193. See, e.g., supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.

772

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

E-mail has flourished. The Internet has blossomed. Cyberspace has
transformed our lives. Whereas at one point, before the frequent use of email and the Internet, the ECPA might have been a visionary ex ante law, it
has since become quite outdated.
This history should not be surprising. Indeed, it is hard to imagine
Congress keeping statutes up to date. Federal legislation is not easy to pass,
and it usually takes a dramatic event to spark interest in creating or updating
a law. Congress often only gets involved when there is a major uproar or
problem, and unless there is a strong impetus, little new lawmaking occurs.
In contrast, courts must get involved every time an issue arises in a case.
As a result, issues are likely to be addressed with more frequency in the
courts than in Congress. Kerr has it exactly backwards.
3. Comprehending Complex Technologies
A basic premise in Kerr’s reasoning is that new technologies are complex
and difficult to understand, and legislatures are better equipped to deal with
such complexities. Specifically, he argues that courts “lack the information
needed to understand how the specific technologies in cases before them fit
into the broader spectrum of changing technologies.”194
There is no reason, however, to assume that the average legislator can
better understand technology than the average judge. There may be a few
in Congress with a good understanding of the technology, but many lack the
foggiest idea about how new technologies work.
Moreover, in many cases, the technologies at issue are not particularly
complex. Do we really need two years and thousands of pages of detailed
information to understand how e-mail works? If understanding e-mail
required knowledge of quantum physics, Kerr’s argument would have more
resonance. In fact, Congress’s electronic surveillance law is infinitely more
complex than the technologies it seeks to regulate.
Expert testimony or an amicus brief can adequately explain the
technology to judges in many cases. There is nothing to suggest that judges
do not have the capacity to understand the Internet, e-mail, pen registers,
and other technologies. Kerr is right that there are many times when judges
are lazy and do not acquire a good understanding, but the same is true of
legislators. Kerr does not offer a reason why the institutional structure of
legislatures shields them from the tendency to be lazy, any more than the
institutional structure of the judiciary shields the courts from laziness.
To illustrate his claim that new technologies are too complex for simple
judicial minds to grasp, Kerr points to United States v. Bach.195 The district
court in that case, according to Kerr, misunderstood how “ISPs comply with
194. Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1, at 807.
195. 310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that there is no Fourth Amendment
requirement that an official be present when executing a warrant to retrieve e-mails from an
ISP).
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court orders to produce records.”196 Is this an issue of high technology?
Kerr wrote an amicus brief and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit agreed with him and reversed. This is an example of the courts
getting it right and understanding the technology. Kerr himself helped
supply the facts about the technology to the Eighth Circuit, and the judges
decided the case correctly, according to Kerr. At most, this example
demonstrates how a district court decided a case incorrectly and was then
reversed by a court of appeals. This is hardly a demonstration of the failure
of the judiciary to grasp the facts. By all accounts, this example
demonstrates that the judicial process works. This is a success story. The
judges got the correct information and decided the case correctly, according
to Kerr.
Kerr then claims that this example is an anomaly: “[I]n most cases,
courts will not possess an informed understanding of the technical facts
they need to appreciate the technology they are attempting to regulate.”197
Why not? This is a bald assumption that Kerr’s example does not support.
The information necessary to understand the technology that Kerr describes
is readily available. In fact, a search of Westlaw will reveal Kerr’s own
articles explaining this technology quite clearly and succinctly. All a judge
has to do is pull up one of Kerr’s articles and read about four pages to
understand the technology. Why is this so complicated? Why is it beyond
the time constraints and mental capacities of judges? The information
about the technology is readily available and does not take an advanced
degree in computer science to comprehend. It is dubious that the brilliant
minds in Congress have more time to learn the workings of technology than
judges concentrating on a specific case.
Furthermore, merely shifting to a statutory regime will not eliminate
Kerr’s concern with judges misunderstanding technology. In fact, many
judicial misunderstandings stem from courts trying to fit new technologies
into old statutory regimes built around old technologies. The problem with
the statutes is that, when they try to track existing technology too closely,
they become too rule-like and lose the flexibility of a standard. Basic
principles get lost or forgotten in the shuffle of technicalities. Discussions
about whether certain new technologies fit into the labyrinthine framework
of electronic surveillance law focus on elucidating confusing definitions or
navigating complicated distinctions.
Principles should guide technology, not vice versa. Instead of focusing
on statutory puzzles, the law should focus on the real issues at stake: Does
a particular technology pose a threat to privacy? What are the dangers?
How might they be mitigated or controlled?
Sadly, courts have also failed to address these important questions,
instead turning on a crabbed conception of Fourth Amendment privacy that
196. Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 1, at 878.
197. Id. at 879.
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seems to have little connection to the issues raised above. As a result, the
Fourth Amendment has been held inapplicable to many new technologies,
creating the void that has been filled, rather poorly, by Congress. The
answer to the problem of creating rules to regulate law enforcement and
new technologies is not to call for judicial caution and leave it to
legislatures to draft the primary law. Rather, the answer is simply to craft
better rules.
B. Difficult Questions for a Dualist Criminal Procedure Regime
The legislative regime Kerr extols suffers from substantial problems both
in process and substance. This Article has attempted to demonstrate why
Kerr’s argument for a legislative institutional advantage is in error. In
doing so, I am not arguing that courts have an institutional advantage over
legislatures.
I remain highly skeptical of institutional competence
arguments, which were a staple of the legal process jurisprudence of the
1950s and 1960s.198 As Edward Rubin observes, the “central principle [of
legal process jurisprudence] was that each governmental institution
possesses a distinctive area of competence such that specific tasks can be
assigned to that institution without reference to the substantive policies
involved.”199 Elsewhere, I have contended that institutional competence
arguments often assume that institutions have “an inherent and unchanging
nature.”200 This is a dubious assumption. In the context of crafting rules to
regulate law enforcement and new technologies, I am not convinced that
either the legislatures or the courts have strong advantages over the other.
Despite the fact that I find Kerr’s case in favor of legislatures to be
wanting, his article is successful at dispelling myths that have long hung
over criminal procedure. Kerr is quite right that criminal procedure is no
longer a realm of judicial constitutional rules, but instead is increasingly
becoming a regime of statutes.201
This development of a dualist regime of both judicial and legislative rules
which sometimes overlap and interact requires significantly more attention.
Thus far, the criminal procedure literature has ignored the fact that we are in
a dualist regime, with both legislative and judicial rules. This raises many
questions: How should courts and legislatures proceed? What should the
proper response to the rise of legislative rules be for courts in particular,
which used to have more of a monopoly on creating criminal procedure
rules? In light of Congress’s increasing foray into criminal procedure, what
should the courts do?
198. Solove, The Darkest Domain, supra note 113, at 1010-11.
199. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1393, 1396 (1996).
200. Solove, The Darkest Domain, supra note 113, at 1011.
201. “[A] basic understanding of criminal procedure rules may someday require as much
knowledge of the United States Code as the United States Reports.” Kerr, Constitutional
Myths, supra note 1, at 806.
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When there is no legislative rule addressing an issue, courts should apply
the Fourth Amendment without any deference or caution. This does not
mean that the Fourth Amendment should always apply, but there is no
justification for caution or restraint in applying it. The courts have taken
too narrow a view of the Fourth Amendment with regard to many issues
involving information, such as the third party doctrine.202 Courts have
restricted Fourth Amendment applicability based on a narrow conception of
privacy, which has impeded courts in looking at the crucial question of
whether a particular law enforcement practice creates a problem, and if so,
how that problem ought to be addressed. In other words, the Fourth
Amendment often gets caught up in an analytical game that loses sight of
the problems. As a result, the Fourth Amendment does not protect against
serious threats to privacy and many law enforcement abuses. A better
approach toward applying the Fourth Amendment is definitely in order, and
such an approach should not be discouraged in favor of the hope of
legislative solutions.
A different scenario exists when courts must examine a case involving
new technologies where a federal statute already exists to regulate law
enforcement use of those technologies. These are cases where, for example,
the Wiretap Act, Stored Communications Act, or Pen Register Act would
apply. Courts could take a few possible approaches. First, in order to
preserve the space upon which Congress has legislated, courts could hold
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply. Such an approach should be
rejected, as the federal legislation in many cases has not been sufficiently
protective of privacy.
Second, courts could hold that the Fourth Amendment applies, and then
determine whether Congress’s legislation is adequate to satisfy Fourth
Amendment requirements. This Article supports such an approach.
Although, in many cases, warrants supported by probable cause are the best
form of protection,203 warrants are a means to an end, not an end in
themselves. Elsewhere, I identified three central principles embodied in the
Fourth Amendment:
minimization, particularization, and control.204
Government investigations must be minimized to prevent sweeping dragnet
searches. Investigations must be particularized to specific individuals
suspected of criminal wrongdoing. And there must be meaningful oversight
over law enforcement activities.
In any particular case in which the Fourth Amendment applies, courts
should apply the Fourth Amendment as they normally would. But suppose
that law enforcement officials were following a statute that establishes
different procedures for conducting surveillance or searches than typical
Fourth Amendment rules. Here, the courts should not hold the law
202. Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 121, at 1133-38.
203. See Solove, supra note 171, at 1299-1303.
204. Solove, Digital Person, supra note 22, at 211.
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enforcement activity invalid simply because it was not conducted pursuant
to the regular Fourth Amendment rules the courts have established. These
regular, judicial Fourth Amendment rules should be viewed as the default
rules, not the only valid rules. Thus, courts should examine whether the
statutory procedures followed by law enforcement in a given case satisfy
the basic principles of the Fourth Amendment. If law enforcement officials
follow a statutory provision that departs from regular Fourth Amendment
procedures but nevertheless adequately addresses minimization,
particularization, and control, then courts should conclude that the search
was valid. Certainly, courts should not have a monopoly on crafting the
rules, and this is where courts and legislatures can establish a useful
dialogue.205
To illustrate this approach more concretely, suppose that Congress passes
the Thermal Sensor Protection Act (“TSPA”). The TSPA provides a set of
rules to regulate law enforcement use of a thermal sensor. The TSPA,
however, also allows the use of a thermal sensor based on a court order that
differs in its standards from the Kyllo requirements for a warrant supported
by probable cause. Although the court order is not a warrant, it does have
other built-in protections. Courts should not simply conclude that any
procedures that differ from the traditional ones required in Kyllo are invalid
under the Fourth Amendment. Instead, courts should examine whether the
TSPA adequately addresses minimization, particularization, and control. If
it does, then the surveillance should be upheld.
The Wiretap Act represents an example of this process. Under traditional
Fourth Amendment doctrine, search warrants generally authorize a single
search. A second search is sometimes justified if it “is a reasonable
continuation of the original search.”206 For electronic surveillance, these
restrictive rules would not make much sense. Surveillance generally must
be continuous and extend for a period of time in order to capture the
necessary communications. The Wiretap Act authorizes a long period of
surveillance, specifically a thirty-day order renewable for another thirty-day
period.207 This is much broader than the kind of search the Fourth
Amendment typically permits. The Wiretap Act, however, has other
protections to compensate for the departure from these minimization goals
of the Fourth Amendment. It requires that courts place minimization
procedures in surveillance orders, and it makes such orders harder to justify,
with law enforcement officials having to explain why other investigative

205. See Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 904, 922
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States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 557-58 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Kaplan, 895
F.2d 618, 623 (9th Cir. 1990).
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2005]

FOURTH AMENDMENT CODIFICATION

777

techniques would not be viable.208 It limits the kind of officials who may
obtain such an order to high-level officials.209 As a result, it compensates
for the thirty-day rule with other ways to achieve minimization. This
provision came about because, just a year before its passage, the Court in
Berger explained how Fourth Amendment principles were to be embodied
in electronic surveillance law.210
In the Berger model, the Court played a leading role in the process. The
Court laid down the basic principles and then let Congress work out the
specifics. Courts should look to whether legislation comports with basic
Fourth Amendment principles. Congress can fill in the gaps or be more
precise where necessary, but this is a bold role for the courts, not a cautious
one.
In short, courts should be very active in shaping new criminal procedure
rules. To the extent that Kerr is urging courts to apply basic Fourth
Amendment principles and be open to allowing legislatures to fill in the
details, his advice is sound. But Kerr’s article appears to suggest much
more than that.
Kerr is right that we need to do a lot more thinking about our dualist
system of criminal procedure. Scholars and many courts still operate under
the assumption that the Fourth Amendment is the nearly exclusive occupier
of the field. Now that we have a large body of statutory regulation, there
are new questions about how we should modulate the relationship between
the Fourth Amendment and the statutes.
Kerr’s article has made a significant contribution. It is time for a focus
on statutes. Unfortunately, the bulk of his article focuses on pushing the
courts aside and suggesting a deferential approach based on faulty legal
process arguments and an incorrect view of the effectiveness of the statutes.
Far from being cautious, courts need to take a larger role in the process to
ensure that the statutes embody basic Fourth Amendment principles.
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